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Introduction
The problem of organizing complex production has for the most part been
analyzed by law and economics scholars in a dichotomous way: production can be
accomplished either through a series of market transactions and contracts, or under the
guidance and control of a hierarchical governance structure within a firm.2 A rich and

1

Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law School, Professor of Law at the University of Illinois
College of Law, and JSD candidate at the University of Illinois College of Law, respectively. The authors
have had the benefit of substantial research assistance from Everett Peaden, Bixuan Wu, Rebecca Conley,
Lily Huang, and Tracy Dry Kane. We appreciate the comments of participants in the IEA Research
Workshop on Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance, University of Trento; the
University of Illinois and Sun Yat-Sen University School of Law, Guangzhou, China, conference on the
Role of Law in Economic Development; the Vanderbilt University Conference on Regulation; the
International Society for the New Institutional Economics 2006 annual meeting; and faculty workshops at
Vanderbilt University Law School, the University of Michigan, the University of Georgia Law School, the
University of North Carolina and Chicago-Kent School of Law. Particular thanks are owed to Ed Rock and
Oliver Williamson for their careful attention to earlier drafts, and to John Conley for his insights regarding
the corporate social responsibility trend in business. Despite the considerable efforts of these colleagues
and students, the authors must accept responsibility for all remaining mistakes and omissions.
2
The classics in this literature include Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 1
(Nov.1937), and Oliver E. Williamson, MARKETS AND HIERACHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975). For much of the last three decades, "law and economics" scholars have tried to
analyze “firms” as little more than “nexuses”, or devices through which a collection of contracts are
coordinated, thus treating enforcement through organizational structure and authority as a subset of
contract enforcement. But as Prof. Coase pointed out in The Nature of the Firm, firms are substitutes for
contracts, see Coase, supra, at 4, a view that is reinforced by the reluctance of courts to get involved in
settling disputes between two participants within a firm, whereas courts, or at least a credible threat of legal
sanctions, are a standard enforcement mechanism for contracts between firms or between an individual and
a firm.
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well-developed literature has emerged in the last few decades analyzing these two modes
(as well as some “hybrid” modes), and considering why one mode might be used in some
circumstances, and the other in different circumstances.3 A more recent, but rapidly
growing, literature has explored how globalization seems to be leading to more
“outsourcing,” in which activities that were once carried on within a single firm are now
being organized by contracts, across multiple firms, perhaps in multiple countries.4
Nearly all of the economic literature on choice of organizational form,
globalization, and the “outsourcing” phenomenon, however, assumes the existence of an
institutional context in which rule of law is followed, minimum social standards and
business norms are established and regulated (or are at least commonly accepted and
followed within a given trade), and contracts can be enforced.5 Given these
characteristics of the institutional context, two firms that both operate in the United States
or other developed counties, for example, can focus in their contracts with each other on
the terms on which the subject of the contract will be carried out, without having to worry
much about baseline or “default” terms. If firm A hires firm B to clean its offices and
facilities, for example, A will not have to specify that B may not use child labor, may not
dump its waste products in the municipal water system, and may not kidnap A’s
3

Some of the foundational literature here includes Williamson, supra note 2; and Benjamin Klein, Robert
A. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, J. L. & Econ. (Oct. 1978).
4
A variety of terms have been used by economists to refer to the phenomenon of outsourcing, including
“vertical specialization,” “intra-product specialization,” and “global production sharing.” For excellent
starting points to explore this literature, see Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Outsourcing in a
Global Economy, 72 REV. ECON. STUD.135 (2005); Robert C. Feenstra, Integration of Trade and
Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 31 (1998).
5
Certainly some of the international trade literature recognizes that the quality of foreign enforcement of
contracts is an important factor in expaining whether a firm relies on international outsourcing to procure
specialized inputs, rather than production within the firm, either domestically or through vertical
integration. See Barbara J. Spencer, International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts, NBER Working
Paper 11418 (2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11418 (last visited Mar. 14, 2007). This
literature focuses on the institutional conditions under which a country can attact global firms to enter into
outsourcing contracts in that country, rather than focusing on decisions within the firm, as does the law and
economics theory of the firm literature that we are describing here.
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executives and hold them for ransom in order to get higher pay than the contract
provides. Nor will the contract have to specify that either firm A or firm B can call the
other into court to settle any future dispute over terms of the contract.6 Those things are
properly taken for granted, because both A and B will be subject to law, regulation, and
customary norms operating in their respective countries.
By contrast, firms that organize production through a long chain of suppliers in a
global marketplace might have to be concerned about such problems, as well as
numerous other problems that arise in the absence of a sophisticated and well-developed
legal and regulatory infrastructure. At least three different literatures have touched on
these problems: a literature in law and economics has considered the importance of rule
of law and property rights protection generally to economic development7; another
literature has focused on the problem of regulating environmental and social behavior of
corporations in the global context8; and the theories of the firm literature in law and
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The contract may specify such things as which courts the parties will go to, which law will be applied,
and whether the parties may have to submit to arbitration first. See, e.g., Erin Ann O’Hara & Larry E.
Ribstein, Corporations and the Market for Law, Working Paper dated Feb. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.ssrn.org. But as long as the parties are willing to accept the default rules, the contract may
leave these details out.
7
See DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE(1990);
for a good summary of this literature, plus classics such as Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Quality of Government, 15(1) J. OF LAW, ECON. & ORG. 222 (Apr.
1999); Dani Rodrik, Institutions For High-Quality Growth: What They Are And How To Acquire Them,
2370 C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2000).
8
This literature began with discussions amongst academics in both law and business about corporate
social responsibility and the difficulty of regulating corporate behavior across national boundaries. For
some introductions to voluminous literature, see, e.g, R. Edward Freeman, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984); David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979). Recently, attention has turned more broadly to what one group of scholars has
called “global administrative law,” which is the term coined by Profs. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch,
Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener to describe the “rapidly changing pattern of transnational
regulation and its administration.” Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B.
Wiener, Foreword: Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to
Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer/Autumn 2005). The conceptual
construct of global administrative law includes both the development of new, pluralistic legal regimes,
including regimes that regulate the social and environmental conditions of production, and also
enforcement of these regimes. Moreover, the global administrative law project seeks to evaluate the
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economics has considered the standard problems of coordination, communication, and
incentive structures in the “make or buy” decision.9 In the latter case, the literature has
generally assumed that various parties contract with each other “in the shadow of the
law.”10 There is also a relevant literature on the development, outside the law, of norms,
reputational constraints, and arbitration mechanisms that may substitute for law in some
circumstances.11
In this article we examine the rapid emergence and expansion of a private-sector
compliance and enforcement infrastructure that we believe may increasingly be providing
a substitute for public legal and regulatory infrastructure in global commerce, especially
in developing countries where rule of law is weak and court systems are absent or
inadequate. This infrastructure is provided by a proliferation of performance codes and
standards (some developed in collaborative processes by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and business), and a rapidly-growing global army of privately-trained and
authorized inspectors and certifiers that we call the “third-party assurance industry.”
Third-party assurance in some form or another has been used to facilitate
commerce for centuries.12 But its growth in very recent years has been phenomenal.13

legitimacy of these new law-making regimes according to such fundamental values of democracy as
accountability, transparency, consent, and participation of the governed.
9
See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 3.
10
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L. J. 950 (1979); Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
11
See generally Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV.. 2328 (2004) (giving an overview of contract
enforcement by firms, courts and reputation; establishing a model for choosing contract enforcement
mechanisms); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Codes’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade:
Evidence on the Maghribu Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST (1989).
12
The earliest use of third party assurance services may have been the role played by several “boards of
state accountants” in verifying state revenues and expenditures in ancient Athens, 500 to 300 B.C. See
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Moreover, whereas the third-party assurance business first developed to facilitate the
making and carrying out of private contracts, we claim that the activities of the assurance
industry are rapidly being deployed for purposes that in the past would be considered
“public” and “regulatory” in nature, and would previously have been left to the authority
of government. Third-party assurance may thus be providing a substitute for both private
and public law in a number of situations, and may even be providing a new institutional
structure through which private commercial exchange may be regulated for essentially
public purposes.
We examine the new prominence of this industry in international commerce and
the reasons why it has exploded onto the scene in the last decade. We also consider
whether the rapid deployment of third-party assurance in business is facilitating the
transmission of global norms of acceptable business behavior to new parts of the world,
or whether, by providing a substitute for law, it is undermining the indigenous
development of sophisticated legal systems.

I. The third party assurance industry and evidence of its growth.
Perhaps the most familiar type of third-party assurance service is the external
auditor, who examines financial statements and the processes by which they were
generated, and opines on whether the statements fairly and accurately reflect the
underlying economic reality.14 Independent external auditors have been critical to the

George J Costouros, Auditing in the Athenian State of the Golden Age (500-300 B.C.), ACCT. HISTORIAN’S
J. 41, 41-50 (Spring 1978).
13
See section I below for evidence of an explosion in recent years in demand for third-party assurance
services, as well as for the development of quantifiable performance metrics by which such services can
measure and report on performance by parties to actual and potential contracts.
14
According to the Global Market Information Database by Euromonitor International, the size of the US
market for accountants’ services has grown by 9.6% from 2000 to 2004, measured in the dollar value of
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development of liquid financial markets in which individuals may invest in market-traded
securities issued by the businesses with reasonable confidence that the information the
company has provided is an accurate reflection of the condition of the underlying
business.
Financial institutions that invest in or insure business ventures have also long
made use of other kinds of assurance services, in addition to financial audits. The
business of assuring and attesting to non-financial matters began at least 150 years ago,
for example, when marine insurance companies in France, Britain, and Italy began hiring
inspectors to make sure that ships being hired for international commerce were seaworthy.15 And financial institutions generally, including insurance companies and
lending institutions, continue to be among the most active users of a variety of third-party
assurance services.16
A. The impact of ISO. A major contributor to the development of a global
assurance service industry has been the widespread adoption since the mid-20th century
of international standards and technical specifications for a vast array of products and
processes. Since its founding in 1946, the International Organization for Standardization

sales. Auditing and accounting services was the largest sector, accounting for 59.7% of sales in 2004. The
UK market has grown by 12% from 2000 to 2004. As an indication of the explosion in demand for audit
services in developing countries, by contrast, he Chinese market for accountants’ services has grown by
304.5% over the years from 1999 to 2003. The market is predicted to expand by 149% to $4,022 million by
2008. Auditing took the largest share in China in 2003, accounting for 66.2 %. See
http://www.euromonitor.com/.
15
RINA (Registro Italiano Navale) is an assurance firm that has provided ship classification and
certification services since its establishment in 1861. See http://www.rina.it/. Since global trade and
insurance predated RINA, we suspect ship inspection services did too. Hence our claim that the business
goes back “at least” that far. Intertek started its maritime survey business in 1885. See
http://www.intertek.com/. http://bpa.odu.edu/port/research/REGULATORYISSUES.doc. )A number of
firms that are currently active in international inspection and assurance services, including RINA, SGS,
BVQI, the TÜVs (Technischer Überwachungsverein), Intertek, and DNV (Det Norske Veritas), had their
origins as firms that inspected ships, and/or their cargo, for international trade. See discussion in Section II
below.
16
Familiar types of third-party assurance services used in financial transactions include auditing, credit
rating, title services, inspections for hazardous materials such as asbestos, and appraisers.
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(ISO) has promulgated thousands of technical standards.17 ISO also disseminates
information about dozens of accreditation bodies that, in turn, accredit hundreds of
organizations that are in the business of carrying out various evaluations to determine if
products or processes or management systems are in conformance with the specifications
in ISO standards.
In 1987, the ISO embarked on a significant new path when it adopted the “ISO
9000” standards of quality management.18 These were the first sets of international
standards that applied to management systems that firms have in place to meet customer
and applicable regulatory requirements, rather than to the characteristics of the products
firms produce or to units and methods of measuring those characteristics.19 Although
certification is not a requirement of the ISO standards, many firms have chosen to have
their systems independently audited and certified to them,20 and certification rapidly
“became a de facto requirement for doing business in Europe and other parts of the

17

“ISO”, from the Greek word for “equal,” was adopted as the “standardized” name for the organization
whose English name is the International Organization for Standardization. ISO is a non-governmental
organization whose member institutes are part of the governmental structure of their countries, or are
mandated by their government. Typically, however, members have their roots in the private sector, having
been set up by national partnerships of industry associations. ISO uses technical committees organized by
subjects for standards development, and at this time has more than 200 such committees. Since its
founding in 1947, ISO has published more than 16,000 product, technical, and performance standards for
the characteristics and quality of raw materials and other tangible production inputs, ranging from
agricultural products, grades of oil and gasoline, metals, ceramics and glues to electrical parts,
nanotechnology, information processing, digital equipment, and so forth.. See
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html (last visited March 9, 2007). ISO standards
often form the basis for trade treaties and agreements. For an excellent description of the role of ISO
standards in international trade, and the process by which it promulgates standards, as well as an early
recognition of what has come to be called new governance, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of
Regulation: The International Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the
Environment, 22 ECOLOGY L. Q. 479, 489-491 (1995).
18
Prior to publication of ISO 9000 standards, the ISO had focused largely on developing internationally
applicable technical standards for products and materials. ISO 9000 was established under the Technical
Committee No. 176 (TC176). The list of technical committees is available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/stdsdevelopment/tc/tclist/TechnicalCommitteeList.TechnicalCommitteeList (last
visited August 14, 2006).
19
See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17, at 499.
20
See The ISO Survey 2004, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prodsservices/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf (last visited July 3, 2006.)
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world,” as well as being actually required for certain products sold in Europe and the
United States.21
The ISO 9000 idea of creating standards for management systems has greatly
fueled the development of the assurance industry.22 The organizations that were first
qualified to certify ISO 9000 compliance were generally European organizations that
were already providing quality inspection services for various products; more recently,
accounting and audit firms have been expanding their business services portfolios to add
capability to perform ISO 9000 certifications.23
Although we have so far not found data tracking growth in the third-party
inspection and assurance industry, data collected by ISO show that the number of firms
and facilities in the world that were ISO 9000 certified grew from 27,816, in 48 countries
in 1993,24 to 670,399 in 154 countries by 2004.25 ISO's approach to compiling these
totals involves surveying the certifying bodies, so these numbers represent the total
number of firms and sites that the certifying bodies claim to have certified. ISO provides
no comparable data on the number of active certifying bodies, but this dramatic
expansion in the number of firms and plants that have been certified could only be
accomplished if the number of people and firms doing certification work had also grown
dramatically.

21

Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17, at 500.
See Stepan Wood, Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability, 229, 261, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY (Richardson & Wood, eds) (2006).
23
Organizations originally in financial auditing , such as KPMG Performance Registra Inc., a wholly
owned subsidiary in Canada of KPMG, LLP and PricewaterhouseCoopers in Canada , have extended their
services to ISO certification. See http://www.kpmg.ca/en/ms/performanceregistrar/services.html and
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/5401765577527120852570CA001771D2 (last visited Aug.
10, 2006). However, most of the certification bodies providing ISO9000 certification, including BVQI, UL,
SGS-ICS, and the like, were already in the quality inspection services sector when the ISO 9000 standards
were developed and promulgated.
24
See http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-14000/pdf/survey10thcycle.pdf; at p. 15.
25
See http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf, at p. 10.
22
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Once the demand for management quality certification had developed sufficiently
to support a private sector infrastructure to certify management systems, it was only a
small step for business, government, NGOs, and social activists to look to these same
sorts of certifying organizations to provide assurance when asking companies to
demonstrate that they are meeting specified criteria for social performance.26 In 1996,
the ISO adopted the ISO 14000 series of standards for evaluating environmental
management systems.27 By 2004, 90,569 facilities and firms, in 127 countries, had been
certified as meeting these standards.28 And ISO is currently developing standards for
social responsibility as well, although ISO asserts that these standards are not intended to
be the basis for third-party certifications.29

26

The American National Standards Institute (which is the U.S. organizational representative to the ISO)
notes growing pressures toward social performance certification on its website. See
http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/history.aspx?menuid=1 (“During the first years of the 21st
Century, those involved in standards-setting activities clearly recognized a growing need for globally
relevant standards and related conformity assessment mechanisms. ‘Market forces’ such as global trade and
competition; societal issues such as health, safety and the environment; an enhanced focus on consumer
needs and involvement and increasing interaction between public-sector and private-sector interests were
significantly impacting standardization and conformity assessment programs. Standards themselves had
expanded well beyond documents identifying product specifications to instead focus on performance issues
and to also include processes, systems and personnel.”)
27
See Reinhardt Peglau, Applauding the success of ISO 14001 should not deafen us to the challenges,
ISO Management Systems, January/February, 2002, 15-16, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso900014000/addresources/articles/pdf/viewpoint_1-02.pdf
28
See http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf, at p. 20.
29
See
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/830949/3934883/3935096/home.html?nodeid=445125
9&vernum=0 (“The guidance standard will be published in 2008 as ISO 26000 and be voluntary to use. It
will not include requirements and will thus not be a certification standard.
“There is a range of many different opinions as to the right approach ranging from strict legislation
at one end to complete freedom at the other. We are looking for a golden middle way that promotes respect
and responsibility based on known reference documents without stifling creativity and development.
“Our work will aim to encourage voluntary commitment to social responsibility and will lead to
common guidance on concepts, definitions and methods of evaluation.
“The need for organizations in both public and private sectors to behave in a socially responsible
way is becoming a generalized requirement of society. It is shared by the stakeholder groups that are
participating in the WG SR [Working Group on Social Responsibility] to develop ISO 26000: industry,
government, labour, consumers, nongovernmental organizations and others, in addition to geographical and
gender-based balance.
“ISO has chosen SIS, Swedish Standards Institute and ABNT, Brazilian Association of Technical
Standards to provide the joint leadership of the ISO WG SR. The WG SR has been given the task of
drafting an International Standard for social responsibility that will be published in 2008 as ISO 26000.”
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B. An overview of assurance organizations
In the past ten to fifteen years, as numerous corporations, NGOs, and other
organizations have developed codes of practice for various industries, firms that have
long been in the business of inspecting the quality, weight, and quantity of traded goods –
especially those that evaluate and certify conformance with ISO standards – have quickly
expanded to offer their services in auditing and certifying that firm operations satisfy
other codes of practice. Firms such as SGS, Intertek, DNV (Det Norske Veritas), BVQI,
RINA (Registro Italiano Navale), and the TÜVs (Technischer Überwachungsverein)
have all been in business as inspectors of goods and ships in international trade since
before 1900. They all operate globally and have had a quasi-official status as inspectors
for customs officials or government agencies regulating products moving in international
markets. All have recently expanded their business to do audits and inspections to verify
compliance with social responsibility standards.30
In addition, dozens of new firms have entered the business as certification bodies,
including firms like Cal Safety Compliance Corp. (CSCC), ALGI, and Hong Kong
Quality Assurance Agency (HKQAA). CSCC, for example, is a division of Specialized
Technology Resources, Inc. in Los Angeles. It was established in 1991 to provide social
responsibility auditing services, initially in the garment sector and now in a broad range

30

BVQI was formed in 1988 in response to the demand for the independent certification of ISO 9000
Quality Management Systems, primarily providing management systems certification, product certification,
and service certification. See http://www.bvqi.com/. DNV, established in 1864, primarily focuses on risk
management certification and consulting, in particular for maritime, oil and gas, process and transportation
industries. See http://www.dnv.com/. Intertek can be traced to three separate companies in 1885, including
Thomas Edison’s Lamp Testing Bureau. It initially provided maritime surveying and testing of electrical
equipment; it now provides testing services and risk management for. a wide range of businesses. See
http://www.intertek.com/. RINA (Registro Italiano Navale), a company established in 1861 in Genova, has
been providing ship classification and certification services since its establishment. See http://www.rina.it/.
SGS, originally founded in 1878 in Rouen as a French grain shipment inspection house and later registered
in Geneva in 1919, provides inspection services of traded goods, product testing services, and certification
services for products, systems or services. See www.sgs.com/.
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of industries including home furnishings, food and agriculture, cosmetics, toys, and hightech products, and has operations in more than 110 countries. Similarly, ALGI,
headquartered in Nyack, NY, was founded in 1994 by several former Department of
Labor officials to do social accountability auditing. TransFair USA was launched in
1998 and began "fair trade" certification of coffee purchased from developing countries
in 1999. It has since expanded to certification of other food products. HKQA was
established in 1989 by the Hong Kong government to do social compliance audits.
C. The ”professionalization” of the inspection industry.
The assurance business is itself largely unregulated, and there are no wellestablished and well-accepted training procedures or professional standards for those who
“audit” non-financial performance indicators. Yet, by its nature it is a business that is rife
with potential for abuse. This is because, as is true for financial audits, inspections and
evaluations of systems and operating practices are usually arranged and purchased by a
supplier company in order to provide assurance to a purchasing company that the supplier
has met contract terms, or complied with certain norms and standards. And, as is true in
the business of providing financial audits, individual auditors might have incentives to
accept payoffs in exchange for approval by the auditors. Likewise, the client firms whose
facilities are being audited might have incentives to offer such payoffs if it is cheaper for
them to make the side payments than it is to comply with the codes or standards. Indeed,
factory owners in developing countries who are being asked by their developed-country
customers to subject themselves to audit, frequently complain that the demands for audits
are a form of extortion.31

31

See, e.g., Dexter Roberts, Pete Engardio, Aaron Bernstein, Stanley Holmes, & Xiang Ji, Secrets, Lies,
and Sweatshops, BUS. WK., Nov. 27, 2006, at 42 (Opening paragraphs tell the story of Tang Yinghong, a
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Suppliers of financial auditing services long ago figured out that there are two
basic mechanisms for addressing this problem: professionalization of the providers of the
service, and investments by the providers in reputations for honesty. Professional
accountants are now required to go through formal training and licensing by
organizations representing accountants, and they typically organize themselves into large,
high-visibility firms with substantial interest in maintaining a reputation for honesty,
independence, and competence. Those firms, in turn, have incentives to see to it that
their auditors are competent, disciplined and behave in professional ways.
These things are only beginning to happen in the nonfinancial assurance business.
Although the leading international firms in the business, such as SGS, Intertek, DNV,
BVQI, RINA, and the TÜVs, mentioned above, have substantial reputational capital at
risk, many smaller, newer assurance firms are in the business that may not yet have
established reputations. Moreover, there is only one significant professional organization
that offers any standardization and assurance of the assurance professionals themselves.
This is the International Register of Certificated Auditors (IRCA), a UK organization
based in London that was founded in 1984 as part of a UK government initiative to
establish and certify quality standards.32 IRCA certifies auditors of management systems,
and approves training organizations and certifies their auditor training courses, and
claims to have certified more than 13,750 auditors in over 120 countries worldwide.33
Generally, however, there is “very little oversight” over the assurance industry.34

manager at a Chinese factory that was due to be inspected for Wal-Mart, when an alleged inspector from an
organization calling itself “Shanghai Corporate Responsibility Management & Consulting Co. called the
manager and said that “for a $5000 fee, he’d take care of Tang’s Wal-Mart problem. ‘He promised us he
could definitely get us a pass for the audit,’ Tang said.”)
32
See http://www.irca.org/about/ (last visited March 9, 2007).
33
Id.
34
Wood, supra note 22, at 199 n. 173.
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II. Factors causing a rapid growth in demand for third party assurance
services.
A number of different factors seem to be at work that, together, are driving the
extraordinary growth in demand for assurance services, and in the supply of businesses
that are offering their services as inspectors and auditors to meet this demand.
A. The rapid opening of international markets in the last two decades,
accompanied by increased reliance on outsourcing, the lengthening of supply chains, and
the extension of supply chains into all parts of the globe.
Other scholars have written at length about the growth in international commerce
in the last few decades,35 and the extent to which corporations in developed countries
now contract with developing country firms for parts manufacturing, assembly, testing,
and even sales (e.g., call centers) and record-keeping.36 When products are made in
factories owned by, and under the immediate supervision of managerial employees of a
large firm, that firm can directly implement its own quality, timely delivery, labor, and
environmental operating norms and standards. When the same firm contracts with a
factory owner in Bangladesh, or Vietnam, or Costa Rica to make the products, the parties
to the contract will probably need to develop alternative mechanisms, other than direct
managerial control, to make certain that the products are still made according to the
hiring firm's specifications (both as to product characteristics and quality, and as to the
35

The international trade literature in particular tracks this growth. See e.g., International Monetary Fund
and World Bank, Market Access for Developing Countries' Exports, (2001) (discussing the international
trade growth from 1960s to 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/madc/eng/042701.htm;
OECD, OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services: Detailed by Partner Country 2000-2003
(2006).
36
See, e.g, George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, working draft dated Aug.
6, 2006, available at http://www.ssrn.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2007); Steve Lohr, Outsourcing Is Climbing
Skills Ladder, N.Y.TIMES, Feb.16, 2006.
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processes used). These mechanisms may range from the hiring firm having its own
inspectors in the contractor’s plant at all times, to having third party inspectors check the
plant's operations from time to time, to relying solely on inspection of the final product at
the time the hiring firm takes possession of it. This last mechanism may be widely-used
for simple commodity-type products made in uncontroversial ways. But, as we discuss
below, such products represent a decreasing share of total trade.
B. The growing complexity of products and increased division of labor within
supply chains.
More of the products being exchanged between firms in international markets are
intermediate products that must meet strict specifications as inputs or components of
other products, or are made utilizing processes that are controversial (e.g., strip mining,
farming with patented seeds and fertilizers and pest control chemicals, or labor-intensive
assembly potentially involving sweatshop conditions or child labor).37 It is common, for
example, for products to be designed in one country, components to be purchased from
suppliers in other countries, assembly work done in yet another country, all for shipment
to markets in a number of other countries.38

37

See FRAGMENTATION: NEW PRODUCTION PATTERNS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Sven W. Arndt &
Henryk Kierzkowski, eds) (2001). For a thoughtful analysis of various controversies involving the
processes by which products are made and the implications of those controversies for various bodies of law
(such as international trade law; domestic environmental, health and safety regulations; and constitutional
analysis of companies’ statements about how their products are made), see Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences
for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 525 (2004).
38
See Grossman & Helpman, supra note 13, at 136. Quoting an example from the 1998 Annual Report of
the WTO concerning the production of a particular “American” car, Grossman and Helpman state:
Thirty per cent of the car’s value goes to Korea for assembly, 17.5% to Japan for components and
advanced technology, 7.5% to Germany for design, 4% to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts,
2.5% to the United Kingdom for advertising and marketing services and 1.5% to Ireland for data
processing. This means that only 37% of the production value …is generated in the United States
(p.36)).
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At each step of the way, the corporations that are organizing all of this productive
activity need to be able to control for quality, conformance to specifications, timely
delivery of intermediate products to final assembly plants, and safety in both the
manufacturing and use of the product. Throughout this process, inventories must be
managed for cost-efficiency, and to provide required levels of customer service.39 For
such products, the purchasing company may have compelling reason to want to monitor
steps in the production process in one way or another.
C. The growing need by global corporations for assurance that firms they are
contracting with can meet requirements for quality, and timely delivery.
The surge in demand from global corporations for third party assurance has grown
out of the need on the part of global buyers to be sure that, if they were going to
outsource an activity to smaller, less-experienced firms in distant countries, those firms
could meet quality standards and timely delivery commitments. That need was the
impetus for the development of the ISO 9000 standards for assuring that organizations
could meet product quality expectations, discussed above.40
The growth of the third-party assurance industry based on ISO standard-setting
was further fueled by developments in the regulation of international trade. Efforts in
Europe to facilitate intra-European trade by harmonizing regulatory requirements
initially emphasized compliance with European technical standards as a necessary
condition for selling any goods in Europe.41 Thus, the standards developed by the
European standard-setting agency, the Comite Europeen de Normalization (CEN), were
39

See e.g., PHILIP B. SCHARY AND TAGE SKJOTT-LARSEN, MANAGING THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN (1998);
BIRGIT DAM JESPERSEN, TAGE SKJOTT-LARSEN, SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2005); JAMES B. AYRES, HANDBOOK OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT (2001).
40
Since the publication of the original ISO 9000 standards, subsequent updates have been published as ISO
9001,9002, and so forth.
41
See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17, at 492.
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applied to any goods sold in Europe. This led non-European companies to argue that
technical and other standards, such as for quality and product safety, should be
developed by the international standard-setting process of the ISO, rather than through a
European process.42 That position was persuasive to negotiators developing the GATT
1994/WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which thus provides that where
international standards for technical requirements exist, member states should use those
standards as the basis for their own technical requirements.43 As a consequence, ISO
certification became necessary for a growing number of products, and as ISO standards
expanded beyond technical specifications to quality and environmental management
systems, a “huge industry of auditors, certifiers and accreditation bodies has emerged to
serve these expanding certification needs.”44
D. The growing need by global corporations for assurance that firms they are
contracting with can meet requirements for workplace safety, acceptable labor and
human rights performance, and acceptable environmental standards, as well as quality
and on-time delivery.
In the last decade, for reasons we discuss below, many global corporations have
begun seeking assurance that firms they do business with can meet social and
environmental standards, in addition to technical and quality standards.45 This focus on

42

See id.
See id at 494-95, citing the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, . Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2.4, reprinted in H.R.
Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1428 (1994).
44
Wood, supra note 22, at 261. Prof. Wood includes companies’ interests in demonstrating conformance
with various voluntary codes of environmental performance and negotiated standards involving
governments and polluters; as well as ISO 14001 environmental management systems, as having provided
the impetus for the rapid expansion of the “huge industry” of third-party certifiers, auditors and
accreditation bodies.
45
One indication of the new attention by business firms to social and environmental performance is the
publication in early 2007 of the first edition of the CSR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES DIRECTORY, which lists
443 organizations worldwide under 49 different service categories, with contact details and summaries of
43
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social and environmental standards is being driven partly by pressure on companies by
some investors. Certain sectors of the investment community, such as public pension
funds and self-described “SRI investors” (for “socially responsible investors”) in the EU,
UK and US, and insurance investors in the UK, are increasingly looking at the social and
environmental performance of their portfolio companies and those companies’ trading
partners in an attempt to identify risks associated with the portfolio firms as well as their
trading partners out in the supply chain.46 This development, in turn, is causing
corporations in developing countries that may be suppliers to more well-known global
corporations to insist that their suppliers, in turn, also meet certain standards.
In this way, multinational firms may be drawing more small and local firms in
more countries into their orbit. As this happens, we are observing a movement toward
global standard setting and the associated use of third-party assurance firms to certify that
standards are being met, even by supplier firms that still operate and sell primarily in
their home country.47 As we discuss at greater length below, we suspect this chain of

the services they offer to assist corporations in meeting so-called “corporate social responsibility” (CSR)
norms and standards See
http://www.ethicalperformance.com/csrdirectory/index.php?PHPSESSID=c78e0151641014186bd7a2fa9d3
05c49 (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
46
See, e.g., Daniel Brooksbank, Norwegian Government Fund Excludes Wal-Mart, IPE.com, June 6, 2006
(Reporting on announcement by Norwegian Government Pension Fund that it had divested its holdings in
Wal-Mart on the grounds that the fund would "incur an unacceptable risk of contributing to serious or
systematic violations of human rights by maintaining its investments in the company."). Another example
is the Association of British Insurers in London, which represents 94% of UK insurers. Insurance
companies in the UK offer savings and investment products in addition to insurance, and control 17% of all
UK company publicly-listed equity. See
http://www.abi.org.uk/BookShop/ResearchReports/Key%20facts%202005_LR.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
2007) The ABI published guidelines in 2002, 2005, and 2007 identifying the kinds of social and
environmental management systems and factual disclosure that its members expect to see discussed on an
annual basis so that, as investors, they can mitigate the risks in their investment portfolios. See text
accompanying notes 73-75, infra.
47
Suzanne Konzelmann, Frank Wilkinson, Charles Craypo and Rabih Aridi, The Export of National
Varieties of Capitalism: The Cases of Wal-Mart and IKEA, Centre for Business Research, University of
Cambridge, Working Paper No. 314, September, 2005, at 18, argue that IKEA, for example, is transferring
its standards for quality, efficiency, and socially responsible behavior “globally to the mutual benefit of all
the system’s stakeholder groups” by implementing its “IKEA Way on Purchasing Home Furnishing
Products (IWAY) throughout its global supply chain.” To implement its standards, “IKEA contracts with
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events is becoming an important mechanism by which developed-country business
standards and norms are being propagated worldwide.48
1. Recognition of the risks to global brands from problems in the supply chains.
Global corporations are also more inclined in the last two decades to insist that
suppliers, as well as their own facilities, meet certain social standards because they
recognize that each link in the supply chain potentially exposes the whole operation to
risks associated with that link.
The experience of companies in the chemical industry (especially companies
operating in Canada), illustrate the pattern. Canadian chemical firms recognized as long
ago as 1983 that risks in the handling of hazardous wastes in foreign operations can affect
reputation and profitability of their worldwide organizations. To address these risks, a
group of chemical companies led by Dow Canada and the Canadian Chemical Producers
Association (CCPA), with encouragement from the Canadian government, agreed to
develop a set of safe operating principles.49 The 1984 explosion of a Union Carbide plant
in Bhopal, India, accelerated the development and adoption of these principles, which

independent auditors to inspect and monitor all suppliers with whom the company does business on an ongoing basis,” according to Konzelmann, et. al., at 19.
48
British Petroleum and Shell, for example, are imposing requirements on smaller companies that provide
maritime services to raise their standards for health, environment and safety and to secure certification of
having met those higher standards. Interview with Anne-Maree O’Connor, Core Ratings (Member of the
DNV Group), London, June 26, 2006 (notes on file with authors). See also Michael P. Vandenberg, The
Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, Vanderbilt University Law
School Working Paper (2006), available at http://www.ssrn.org.
That supply chain pressures can affect the standards of conduct expected of companies is
consistent with the legal transplant literature. See, e.g., Johnathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal
Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process,
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (2003)(categorizing types of legal transplants; one of which is the externallydictated transplant; where a foreign individual or entity may require adoption of certain laws as a condition
for doing business).
49
See J. Arthur O’Conner, Responsible Care: Doing the Right Thing, Canada’s Chemical Producers:
Chemistry – a part of everyday life/Responsible Care,
http://www.ccpa.ca/files/Library/Documents/RC/Doing_the_Right_Thing_history_of_RC.doc (last visited
June 22, 2006).
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came to be called the Responsible Care Initiative (RCI), as other chemical companies
joined the initiative in an effort to improve the industry’s reputation.50
The initiative originally included six standards for safe practice in chemical
production, transport and control.51 Although the standards had been adopted by
numerous chemical companies by 1988,52 by 1993, chemical firms were learning, as
Responsible Care executive Brian Wastle explained to us, that the mere fact that “CEOs
stated they had met their commitment meant nothing to an untrusting public.”53 So the
standards were expanded to include provision for verification and ongoing improvement
of performance.54
Responsible Care executive Wastle reports that the standards now require that
“teams of industry experts, public advocates and local citizens,” review each company
every three years, and “write a consensus report summarizing the verification process and
players, opportunities for improvement, findings, required corrective action and
successful practices,” with verification certificates awarded once the work is completed.55

50

See Jean M. Bélanger, Responsible Care in Canada: The Evolution of an Ethic and a Commitment, 27
CHEM. INT’L. 2, March-April, 2005, http://www.iupac.org/publications/ci/2005/2702/1_belanger.html (last
visited June 22, 2006) .
51
The six categories of the original standards included 1) Community awareness and emergency response;
2) Research and development; 3) Manufacturing; 4) Transportation; 5) Distribution; and 6) Hazardous
waste management. See Canada’s Chemical Producers: Chemistry – a part of everyday life/Responsible
Care, http://www.ccpa.ca/ResponsibleCare/ (last visited June 22, 2006).
52
Chemical companies that were part of the original Responsible Care Initiative include Dow Chemical
Canada, ICI subsidiary CIL, Union Carbide Canada, Imperial Oil Chemicals, H.L. Blachford, RhonePoulenc Canada, Ethyl Canada, Rohm & Haas Canada, Hoescht Celanese, General Chemical, Allied
Chemicals, Shell (chemical division), Cyanamide Canada, and Polysar. Email from Brian Wastle, Vice
President, Responsible Care®, Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association, Ottowa Ontario, June 22, 2006.
53
Id.
54
Under the heading “Other Aspects of Responsible Care,” the RC code now includes the following: “The
ultimate test of Responsible Care is whether it delivers improved performance. On an ongoing basis,
CCPA member companies must track, improve and report to their publics how they are performing in all
the aspects of health, safety, environmental and social performance that are important to those publics.
CCPA collects, collates and publishes data from all companies that our critics have told us they are
particularly interested in. These include chemical emissions and wastes, with five-year projections,
employee injuries and illnesses, chemical process spills and fires and transportation accidents.” Id.
55
Id.
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Similarly, firms that use highly labor-intensive manufacturing and assembly
processes, such as apparel and toy manufacturers, have responded to media attacks on
firms whose products were allegedly made in "sweatshop" conditions 56 by developing
codes of practice for their own factories and for supplier factories. But these firms have
also learned that announcing codes of practice is not sufficient to solve the problem57 –
they must also develop implementation strategies and arrange for inspection and
certification to be sure the codes are in fact implemented.
To enhance brand protection by tackling the implementation problem in one
industry, for example, a group of corporations in the apparel and “sewn products”
industries, together with industry trade associations,58 provided seed money and technical
support to form a third-party standard-setting organization called WRAP (Worldwide
Responsible Apparel Production) in the late 1990s, with the goal of establishing worker
56

The iconic examples here include the negative publicity in the late 1990’s surrounding sweatshop
working conditions in manufacturing plants making Nike products and Kathy Lee Gifford brand apparel for
Wal-Mart. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1285-86 & fns. 441-3 (1999) (discussing press concerning Nike
and Kathy Lee Gifford examples). See also KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEVI’S CHILDREN: COMING TO TERMS
WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 58-65 (2000) (discussing sweatshop allegations
concerning Nike, Kathy Lee Gifford and Wal-Mart and the resulting negative press).
57
Wal-Mart has posted 10 "Guiding Ethical Principles" on its website, and states that it periodically
inspects its factories for implementation, and yet continues to come under fire for tolerating poor working
conditions in supplier factories. See, e.g., Konzelmann, et.al., supra note 47, at 21-22 (reporting on studies
of Wal-Mart’s labor practices, state-level sanctions for “repeated violations of child safety ordinances,
wage and hour regulations and anti-discrimination mandates,” and lawsuits alleging wide-spread practice of
forced “off-the-clock” work). See also Brooksbank, supra note 46 (expressing the Norwegian Government
Pension Fund’s view that continued investment in WalMart would “contribute to serious or systematic
violations of human rights”); and Steven Greenhouse and Michael Barbaro, An Ugly Side of Free Trade:
Sweatshops in Jordan, N. Y.TIMES, May 3, 2006, at C1 (reporting on a study by the National Labor
Committee finding substandard conditions and abuse of employees at more than 25 out of 100 apparel
factories in Jordan, including factories that supply Wal-Mart and Jones Apparel). Immediately after the
National Labor Committee study findings were released Democrats in Congress pledged to introduce
legislation to prohibit import or sale of goods made under conditions that violate core International Labor
Organization worker rights standards, illustrating one of the risks global corporations face if they do not
successfully enforce adequate labor practices at factories from which they buy product. See Kristi Ellis,
House Democrats Ask Bush to Investigate Jordan Abuse, WWD.COM, May 4, 2006.
58
In 1998, several prominent U.S. apparel producers approached the American Apparel Manufacturers
Association (which subsequently merged with the Footwear Industries of American and the Fashion
Association to form the American Apparel and Footwear Association) to work collaboratively to develop
and implement labor, health, safety and environmental standards at the factory level. See WRAP website at
http://www.wrapapparel.org/ (last visited June 21, 2006).
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safety and human rights performance standards to be applied at the factory level, and to
implement inspection and certification procedures.59 WRAP is now formally an
independent non-profit organization, governed by a board of directors of which, by the
organization’s bylaws, more than half must be unaffiliated with the apparel industry.60
Factory certification by WRAP requires that the facilities meet initial standards, as
certified by an approved independent monitor, and be subject to unannounced audits, and
annual renewal.61
The awareness of supply-chain risks is amplified by recognition on the part of
corporations and their investors that a large share of the economic value that firms create
is tied to their “brand value.”62 But, as discussed above, brand value is only as good as
its weakest link because expansion in international travel and communications makes it
harder for firms to hide their "dirty laundry.” Wal-Mart, for example, has undertaken a
massive public-relations campaign, including drawing attention to its new code of ethics,
to attempt to respond to critics who charge that its suppliers violate international labor

59

The first result of the AAMA initiative was the twelve Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production
Principles -- standards of labor practices, factory conditions, and environmental and customs compliance.
The AAMA Board of Directors publicly endorsed these principles in 1998. For the next two years, the
Association worked with producers, public interest groups, and development agencies to “design a process
and develop an organization to monitor and certify factories for compliance—in hundreds of details—with
the principles.”Statement of AAMA Board of Directors, available at
http://www.wrapapparel.org/modules.php?name=Congent&pa=whowpage&pid=26 (last visited June 21,
2006) The fruit of this work was the incorporation of WRAP in 2000 as a "501 [c] 6" organization. Id.
60
See http://www.wrapapparel.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=5. One of us (Blair)
has served as an independent board member of WRAP since 2005.
61
The organization is working to obtain commitments from apparel firms and retailers that products that
carry certain brands must be made in factories that are certified. Dara O’Rourke, Global Economic
Governance Programme Working Paper 2005/16, Dept. of Politics and International Relations, Oxford
University, describes and compares six major international programs that provide what he calls “nongovernmental regulation” in the apparel and sewn products industries, including WRAP, Social
Accountability International (SA8000) (discussed below), Fair Labor Association, Ethical Trading
Initiative, Fair Wear Foundation, and Worker Rights Consortium.
62
A 1999 study by Stanford economist Robert Hall found that less than one-third of the market value of
corporate financial claims in that year could be attributed to the value of physical assets owned by
corporations, suggesting that the rest of the value was tied to intangible assets such as brand value. See
Robert E. Hall, E-Capital: The Link between the Stock Market and the Labor Market in the 1990s,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (2000).
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norms.63 Although its code notably lacks both specifics about standards of treatment for
workers, and enforcement mechanisms, Wal-Mart may very well not be the worst
offender among U.S. retailers in its tolerance of labor abuses in supplier factories. But
because of the high visibility of its brand, it is believed to be very influential in
establishing industry norms, and hence may be targeted more intensely by NGOs and
other activists than smaller, less well-known firms.
2. The increasing sophistication of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), activists, and institutional investors in pressuring corporations to pay attention
to environmental issues or human rights or labor concerns, and in publicizing failures in
these areas.
As corporations find themselves in the glare of the NGO spotlight for their social
and environmental practices, a growing number of firms are looking for better ways to
make sure they know what is actually happening out in their supply chains. Moreover,
activists and investors are increasingly asking corporations to provide information about
their social performance. This, in turn, has created demand for services of firms that can

63

Wal-Mart's website notes that its "Global Ethics Office" was established in June, 2004, and, on June 4,
2004, according to the website, "Wal-Mart released a revised Global Statement of Ethics to communicate
our ethical standards to all Wal-Mart facilities and stakeholders. The Global Ethics Office provides
guidance in making ethical decisions based on the Global Statement of Ethics and a process for anonymous
reporting of suspected ethics violation. . . " Wal-Mart's principles are:
1. Follow the law at all times.
2. Be honest and fair
3. Never manipulate, misrepresent, abuse or conceal information
4. Avoid conflicts of interest between work and personal affairs
5. Never discriminate against anyone
6. Never act unethically – even if someone else instructs you to do so
7. Never ask someone to act unethically
8. Seek assistance if you have questions about the Statement of Ethics or if you face an ethical
dilemma
9. Cooperate with any investigation of a possible ethics violation
10. Report ethics violations or suspected violations
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audit the quality of the non-financial information being produced. Some major
accounting firms, such as KPMG and PricewaterhousCoopers, have recently established
global sustainability practice groups, for example, with the specialized expertise
necessary to attest to environmental and social data.64
The activism of NGOs is accompanied by a proliferation of social and
environmental responsibility standards over the past ten years,. These initiatives have
been developed by states; public/private partnerships; multi-stakeholder negotiation
processes; industries and companies; institutional investors; functional groups such as
accountancy firms and social assurance consulting groups (many of which did not exist
more than about five years ago); NGOs; and non-financial ratings agencies.65
One example (among many) is Social Accountability 8000 (“SA 8000"), a
project of Social Accountability International. SA 8000 is an auditable certification
standard based on international labor and human rights standards.66 SA8000 also
provides a social accountability management system to guide firms in implementing
standards and to demonstrate ongoing conformance with the standards. In particular, to

64

See KPMG Sustainability Services, available at http://www.kpmg.nl/site.asp?Id=40378 (last visited
Feb. 5, 2007); Price Waterhouse/Coopers Sustainability Practice Website, available at
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/challenges.nsf/docid/58E92287890B5314852570980064ACC2 (last visited
Feb. 5, 2007).
65
The implications of these standards for theories of corporate governance, regulation, and economic
development are profound, some of which one of the authors has explored in prior work. See John M.
Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed and Embellish: The Theory and Practice of Corporate
Social Responsibility, 31 J. CORP. L. 1 (2005); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third
Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORN. INT’L. J. J. 493(2005);
Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 J. OF INT’L.
L. & POLITICS 457 (2004).
66
This standard is a voluntary, universal standard for companies interested in auditing and certifying labor
practices in their facilities and those of their suppliers and vendors, based on the principles of international
human rights norms as described in International Labour Organisation conventions, the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It measures the
performance of companies in eight key areas: child labor, forced labor, health and safety, free association
and collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours and compensation. See
Overview of SA8000, available at http://www.saintl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=473 (last visited August 10, 2006).
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meet SA 8000 standards requires third-party certification of individual production
facilities such as factories or farms, based upon an inspection by SAI-approved inspectors
and other third party inspectors. Corporations that seek SA 8000 stamp of approval must
stipulate in written purchase contracts with all suppliers that those suppliers conform to
the SA 8000 standards.67
In addition to apparel and chemicals, discussed above, a number of other
industries have promulgated voluntary corporate social responsibility standards that
incorporate third-party certification that products being sold have been produced,
harvested or extracted according to the standards, such as certification of conflict-free
diamonds;68 sustainable fisheries69 and forestry;70 and fair-trade goods such as coffee,

67

Social Accountability 8000: 2001, International Standards, available at
http://ce35.citysoft.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=document.showDocumentByID&nodeID=1&DocumentID=
136 (last visited July 2, 2006).
68
See The Kimberly Process, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080. The Kimberly Process
is a joint government, international diamond industry and civil society initiative to ensure that shipments of
diamonds are free of “conflict diamonds” that have been sold to support wars in such countries as Angola,
Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. Id. The Kimberly Process
Certification Scheme requires participating governments to implement import/export controls and systems
to track diamonds from mining through export. Rough diamonds exported with a Kimberly Process
Certificate must be in sealed containers, and participating countries must set up systems to ensure that
rough diamonds cannot be exported except in sealed containers with Certificates. See
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/www_docs/related_docs1/kp_review_final_report__english_(jan_31).pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). All significant diamond producing and trading centers,
with the exception of Liberia, are now operating within the framework of the Kimberly Process. Id. at 19.
Review of the systems countries have implemented is delegated to multi-stakeholder teams composed of
industry, government and civil society participants, with results being delivered to the Kimberly Process
Working Group on Monitoring.
69
See, e.g., the Marine Stewardship Council certification process, available at http://www.msc.org: The
Marine Stewardship Council is a global non-profit that has created an environmental standard for wellmanaged fisheries, according to which third-party certifiers can grant labels that assure that fish have been
grown in well-managed fisheries, or caught according to environmentally sustainable principles. See
http://www.msc.org/html/content_462.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). As with many of the certification
schemes for products, an important part of the certification is of “chain of custody” procedures that attempt
to ensure the value of the certified label. See id. The third-party certifiers that have been accredited are
Scientific Certification Systems, SGS Product and Process Certifiers, Moody Marine Ltd., and OIA.
70
See Forest Stewardship Council: Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/fscprinciples.html. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is an
international body composed of industry participants, transnational environmental NGOs and social justice
NGOs, strongly influenced by international standard setting processes at the ISO, and which accredits
organizations to certify timber and forest products as meeting the FSC standard for sustainable forest
management. See Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the Case
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tea, cocoa and cotton.71 Thousands of individual companies have adopted voluntary
codes of conduct establishing their standards for responsible business behavior, and some
companies then engage third-party certifiers to ensure that their suppliers and subsidiaries
are meeting those codes.72 The development of codes and standards and the increasing
expectation that global firms take responsibility for implementing and enforcing these
standards throughout their supply chains have greatly expanded the role of third-party
assurance in global business, even though demand for quality, speed, timely-delivery and
cost control may have provided the initial impetus for this expansion.
E. The growing demands for transparency (as well as quality and social
responsibility).
Institutional investor networks are also asking for improved quality and quantity
of information from their portfolio companies. Investors in the UK have been leaders in
this development, In 2002, for example, the Association of British Insurers (“ABI”),
which represents insurers that control 17% of stocks listed in the UK, issued its
Disclosure Guidelines on Social Responsibility.73 In those guidelines, which it updated
in 2005 and 2007,74 the ABI stated that it expects portfolio companies to provide
information on an annual basis about how boards of directors evaluate and are addressing

of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 47, 51 (2006) (analysis of the competition between forestry certification
regimes and implications for global governance). The FSC accredits certifying organizations, and there
are currently 12 accredited certification organizations, including SGS, Eurocertifor, KPMG FSCI (Forest
Certification Services Inc), Swiss Association for Quality and Managements Systems (SQS), Smartwood
Program, and others. See id. at 74, citing http://www.fscus.org./faqs/what_is_certification.php
71
See http://www.fairtrade.net/certification_mark.html for an overview of the fair trade requirements.
72
The University of Minnesota Law School, under the leadership of international human rights scholar
Prof. David Weissbrodt, has an extensive collection of human rights materials on-line, including copies of
hundreds of firms’ codes of conduct. See http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/business/sicc.html.
73
See http://www.abi.org.uk/Newsreleases/viewNewsRelease.asp?nrid=3676.
74
See http://www.politics.co.uk/press-releases/domestic-policy/environment/environment/abi-publishesresponsible-investment-disclosure-guidelines-$464874.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
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environmental, social, and governance risks, in the context of the entire range of risks and
opportunities facing the company.75
Climate change has become a particularly salient environmental risk that U.K.
investor networks target in their disclosure requests. One example is the Carbon
Disclosure Project (“CDP”), a process by a group now comprised of 284 British,
European and American institutional investors, with $41 trillion of money under
management.76 The CDP elicits information on an annual basis from companies
worldwide about the financial risks to the companies from the physical effects of climate
change or from regulatory efforts to mitigate those physical changes, and about company
actions to manage and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.77 In 2007, CDP sought
information from 2,400 of the world’s largest quoted companies, by market
capitalization, expanding its requests beyond the Global 500 to include the largest
companies in various developed and rapidly developing markets, as well as the largest
companies in transport and utilities. These pressures from institutional investors in the
UK and Europe have been an important impetus for new requirements in those
jurisdictions for companies to discuss future risks to the business from social,
environmental and community matters in their Annual Reports.78
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At the same time, firms and investors increasingly recognize that traditional
financial measures fail to capture the value within companies from such intangible factors
as employees’ knowledge, training and development.79 The recognition that such factors
are important is driving a search by corporations, consultants, auditors and institutional
investors for auditable non-financial metrics that can be used to measure and report on
company performance in developing and protecting important intangible assets such as
employee capabilities, brand, and reputation.
The pressure on companies to collect and disclose more relevant non-financial
information, has been accompanied by pressure to have their approach to assembling
such data subject to third-party review. In 2005, 52% of Global 250 companies issued
non-financial, sustainability reports, including social, environmental and economic data,80
and of these, 30% included independent, third-party assurance of the quality and accuracy
of the underlying data.81 Major accounting firms currently dominate the non-financial
assurance and attestation market, issuing attestation statements [CHECK distinction
between attestation and assurance] for 60% of those sustainability reports that are
independently verified.82
Two global standards are under development for the assurance of non-financial
reports. In March, 2003, the UK based AccountAbility organization issued AA 1000AS,
which focuses on evaluating the materiality, completeness and responsiveness of a
79
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company’s reporting to its various stakeholder groups.83 In December, 2003, the
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)’s International Auditing and Assurance
Standards Board (IAASB), which is the body responsible for issuing international
accounting and auditing standards, issued guidance for accounting firms to use in order to
guide their assurance work for non-financial reports.84 This standard is applicable to any
assurance work by accountants after January 1, 2005, and was needed, according to the
IFAC, to meet the increasing demand for assurance reports on “[e]nvironmental, social
and sustainability reports, information systems, internal control, corporate governance
processes and compliance with grant conditions, contracts and regulations.”85

III. An examination of these developments: China as a case study
In both the short run, and possibly in the long run, the developments surveyed
above point toward a rapidly developing shift in the sources of regulatory authority
towards private standard setting,86 and private enforcement through inspection,
monitoring and certification services by third party assurance service organizations. The
increasing reliance by global corporations on third party assurance services in lieu of
either direct control of production in facilities owned by the corporations, or court
enforcement of contracts entered into with locally-owned businesses, raises questions
about how corporations may be influencing the development of law and legal institutions
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in developing countries. It seems possible, for example, that when industries and civil
society bypass government to develop standards and private mechanisms of enforcement,
they implicitly demonstrate the benefits to a society from having clear legal rules and
sophisticated, independent courts that can enforce those rules. This may help foster an
interest on the part of middle class entrepreneurs and business people in rule of law
institutions, thereby hastening their establishment in developing countries.
Business people who are under pressure to meet numerous different codes and
standards may also begin to support regulation and enforcement by local governments to
avoid multiple inspections and fees and possibly conflicting standards. Moreover, once
some businesses are required to meet higher standards, they often find that it is in their
interest that the same regulatory requirements be imposed on their competitors. For these
reasons we might expect that widespread use of third party assurance services to help
implement business norms and enforce contracts will hasten the movement toward rule of
law.
On the other hand, to the extent that private-sector arrangements provide a
satisfactory substitute for government-provided local legal institutions, they may take
pressure off governments to build independent uncorrupted legal institutions, and thereby
slow down the movement toward rule of law. For example, some critics of efforts by
NGOs to act as watchdogs in enforcing agreements about labor protections in factories
have argued that local governments are “ceding some of their sovereignty to consumers”
and that NGOs may thereby “ultimately undermine traditional regulatory processes.”87
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Whether we observe either outcome is likely to vary from country, to country. It
may also vary as between enforcing contract terms having to do with quality and timely
delivery, versus enforcing terms established to meet social performance expectations.88
We do not have clear answers to these questions yet, but a telling case is the
debate currently under way among Chinese factory owners, their corporate customers
from developed countries, human rights and labor advocates, and Chinese government
officials about whether Chinese firms should accept standards imposed on them by
outsiders and submit to private third-party inspectors to ensure those standards are met.
China's case is interesting because the emergence of a network of firms attempting to do
inspection and certification work in China was initially driven by the demand by
developed country apparel firms and retailers that supplier firms in China meet social
standards, especially for workplace safety and fair labor practices. But it is now rapidly
spreading to other industries, and, more importantly, the Chinese appear to be trying to
take responsibility themselves for creating social standards and for certifying that
factories meet those standards.
The story of China's amazing rush to industrialize and compete in the global
economy in the last two decades is now fairly well known. China began opening up its
markets and encouraging production of goods for foreign markets in the 1980s, and by
the mid- to late-1990s had become one of the world's largest suppliers of textile and
apparel products, toys, and other labor-intensive, relatively low-technology products.89
Early on in this process, little attention was paid either by Chinese factory managers or by
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their global customers to how such products were made. Buyers were focused mainly on
price, delivery speed, quality, and reliability. These are factors that buyers can observe
for themselves with simple goods like apparel and toys, and they consequently did not
worry about the conditions under which the products were being made.
By the early 1990s, however, the international press began writing stories about
the appalling conditions in factories where branded products were being made.90 By
1995 and 1996, a few high-visibility corporations, including Nike, The Gap, and Kathy
Lee Gifford's apparel line for Wal-Mart, were being targeted relentlessly by news reports
and social activists for operating sweatshops in developing countries. In response, some
firms adopted their own codes of practice for their vendors. 91 But that didn't end the
drumbeat of bad publicity, so the industry began working with NGOs, labor organizations
and other groups to develop codes of best practice and to figure out how to get their
supplier firms to implement them. (See discussion above in Section II (D)) The SA 8000
standards were among the first such codes,92 Since 2000, numerous international
companies that have Chinese factories in their supply chains have been attempting to
require that the Chinese factories meet a variety of social responsibility standards,
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including SA 8000, WRAP, and ICTII (toy manufacturers) and some codes developed
internally by certain large buyers.93
Just telling factories that they must meet certain standards does not make it
happen in practice, however.94 The mechanism that global customers have used to
pressure supplier factories to meet standards is the requirement in their contracts with
Chinese companies that the factories be inspected and certified either by inspectors from
the buyer corporation, or by third party inspectors and certifiers.95
The initial reaction of Chinese manufacturing companies (as well as some
Chinese scholars, policy analysts and businessmen) to customer pressures to meet social
standards such as SA8000 was surprise, hostility to the standards, and panic because
meeting the standards would require higher costs and make it more difficult, factory
owners believed, for Chinese firms to win contracts with big buyers.96 Some went so far
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as to charge that the requirement was a new form of non-tariff barrier,97 a protectionist
measure designed to “undercut competitiveness of developing countries.”98 For reasons
that aren't entirely clear, the SA8000 certification program has been the most
controversial and in the last few years, in fact, has become a lightning rod for widespread
resentment and distrust among owners and operators of Chinese facilities that are asked
to meet the standards by their big-name global customers.
Chinese critics of social responsibility standards have further challenged the
purpose of the SA8000 requirements on the grounds that few facilities in developed
countries have been required to meet SA8000 standards, and that, while SA8000 requires
that certified facilities must protect freedom of association, the rate of unionization in the
United States, where SA8000 standards were developed, is very low.99 And critics have
expressed resentment about meeting SA8000 requirements because the SA8000 process
is costly, often requiring that fees be paid to certification bodies not only for the
certification itself, but for consulting assistance required to meet the standards. It is
widely believed in China that the high consulting fees are products of the unregulated
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certification markets. 100 Moreover, the unwillingness of buyer corporations to absorb the
additional cost of meeting social standards, plus the lack of training and unprofessional
behavior by auditors for the certifying firms, have led Chinese firms to believe that the
certification process is not taken seriously by buyer firms, and, in practice, certification is
more or less an extortion scheme, in which certifying organizations will certify
manufacturing facilities that adequately pay off the certifier.101 Not surprisingly, some
Chinese suppliers have found ways to falsify their records and satisfy the auditors with
superficial changes.102
Participants in the debate over SA 8000 in China have also charged that, while
imposition of social accountability standards by multinational companies may please the
customers of those companies, this amounts to "value imperialism" by western society.103
Factories that supply products for China's domestic market are not being required to meet
similar standards, they note. The reality behind this complaint, however, is more
complicated. China's own labor protection laws are in fact very similar to the
requirements of SA8000, though, in practice, they are typically not enforced for lack of
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resources and other factors.104 By contrast, multinational firms with the help of the
inspection/certification firms, can enforce the SA8000 requirements, by threatening to
cancel orders if plants fail to meet standards as reported by the certifying firms.105 This
suggests that the multinational corporations who are insisting on third party inspection to
enforce social norms in Chinese factories are, in fact, merely implementing standards that
China's own leaders have articulated in Chinese law.
Moreover, recent developments in China suggest that resistance to the social
performance standards implied by SA 8000 and other internationally imposed standards
may be softening, that China may even be moving to embrace and implement such
standards on their own. One surprising development is the fact that job growth in the
industrial regions of China has actually exceeded the pace at which potential workers are
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August 12, 2006).
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flowing into those regions from rural areas, creating some actual shortages of skilled or
experienced labor in some areas.106 The shortages are blamed in part on "low wages and
poor working conditions,"107 but may also be due to migration policies in China designed
to slow the movement of people out of the countryside into the urban industrial
centers.108
The second development is the growing unrest in China over the widening gap
between rich and poor, between interior areas and coastal regions, as well as between
urban and rural regions, and the dissatisfaction of lower-income groups over low pay and
the appalling standards at factories that serve only domestic markets.109 These two
factors have led China's own working classes and intellectual elite to begin demanding
that factories that serve only the domestic market should also be required to meet higher
standards for safety and worker protection.110
In response to these problems, there has been a subtle change in attitude toward
"corporate social responsibility" standards among scholars, officials, and the general
public in China. For example, derogatory words such as "stick" (Da Bang), and "nontariff barrier" are being used less frequently.111 Moreover, the Chinese central
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government has explicitly endorsed a number of goals related to corporate social
responsibility. In its Five Year Plan for National Economic & Social Development of the
People's Republic of China adopted in March, 2006, by the National People's Congress,
two of the twelve national priorities listed in the Plan relate directly to improving the
standards of social responsibility to which Chinese firms are held. These are "building a
socialist harmonious society," and "building a resource-conserving and environmentfriendly society."112 It has become widely accepted among scholars and officials that the
implementation of socially responsible norms by business is an integral part of what the
phrase building a "harmonious socialist society" means.113
China's new embrace of the idea of requiring socially responsible behavior by
business firms, however, may not, in the long run, translate into more business for
western inspection and certification services. Within the last year, the Chinese
government in Beijing has authorized the Ministry of Commerce to work with seven
other Chinese agencies to develop "corporate social responsibility" standards, and the
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China National Textile and Apparel Council has created the Committee for the Promotion
of Corporate Social Accountability System for Chinese Textile Enterprises. This set of
standards has been given the title "CSC9000T" (in obvious imitation of the "ISO9000"
and "SA8000" models114), and bears a strong resemblance to standards developed by
WRAP and SAI for apparel and textile manufacturing facilities. CSC9000T is defined as
"a social responsibility management system based on the Chinese laws and regulations,
international conventions and practices, as well as China's special needs."115 A special
committee, the Responsible Supply Chain Association, has been established by the China
National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC) to promote the implementation of
CSC9000T.116
Both the English and Chinese versions of the CSC9000T website make clear,
though, that “[t]he CSC9000T is not intended for the purpose of audit and
certification.”117 Instead of following the certification model developed in western
countries, CSC9000T invents a so-called “third-party evaluation model” structured with
Chinese characteristics. CSC9000T is described as a management model based on a
“Plan-Do-Check-Act” system. “Check” means evaluating systems of production,
identifying problems and finding solutions. The process is aided by third party evaluation
organizations. The evaluation reports by the third party organizations are subject to the
final approval by the Responsible Supply Chain Association (RSCA), which is a group of
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companies doing business in China with a commitment to CSC9000T. Firms then
develop plans to address problems identified in the evaluation, and their efforts to
implement these plans will eventually be rated by the third party evaluation organization.
The ratings are either defensive, complaint, managerial, strategic or civil. It is claimed by
the CSC9000T that these ratings are basically the five stages of constructing corporate
social responsibility. The evaluation reports and ratings will not be available to the
public, however. According to the CSC9000T Principles, a firm can demonstrate its
compliance with the CSC Principles to its stakeholders, buyers or other third parties by
voluntarily disclosing the results of the evaluation, but that is not a required part of the
process.
RSCA is, in principle, responsible for ensuring the independence of the so-called
“third party evaluation organizations” by evaluating the capacity of the organizations, the
training of evaluators, monitoring of the evaluation process conducted by the third party
evaluation organizations and handling of disputes over ratings and reports. Currently
there are 168 members of RSCA, including state-owned enterprises, joint ventures,
wholly foreign enterprises, and Chinese firms, although most are domestic Chinese firms.
There are two non-Chinese domestic companies – Hudson’s Bay Company, a large
department store group in Canada; and Linmark Group, a Hong-Kong Based company –
that have endorsed CSC9000T by being cooperative partners with RSCA.
Substantively, CSC9000T is more like ISO14000 than SA8000 with regard to the
underlying philosophy being used. That is, the standards set forth in the CSC9000T are
long-term goals or commitments rather than immediately applicable substantive
standards. CSC9000T is a management tool to help a firm manage its social
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responsibility risk, as well as improve its performance, rather than a standard by which to
certify performance. The function of the CSC9000T is said to be to promote continual
improvement in labor protection, without an explicit substantive end-point that has been
defined. Procedurally, CSC9000T provides for “third party evaluation organizations,”
but these organizations’ functions are limited and their independence is questionable.
RSCA controls the process, from deciding the eligibility of evaluating organizations and
monitoring the process of evaluations to approving the actual reports that the evaluators
generate. Since the members of the RSCA are the same firms that are subject to
CSC9000T evaluation – Chinese domestic companies – there is the obvious potential for
conflicts of interest, and for the process to be used to promote the appearance but not the
reality of improving labor and other social conditions. Moreover, since the evaluation
reports and ratings will not be available to the public, the pressure from buyers in the
supply chain may still be the only mechanism for ensuring these firms actually improve
their labor standards. And, so far as we can tell, there are no global customers accepting
CSC9000T evaluations instead of certification to SA8000, or WRAP, or to the
customers’ codes of conduct.
What effect of CSC9000T will have on the development of law and norms in
China is not yet known, of course, and it is too soon to be entirely confident about its
likely effect. While CSC9000T does not, in principle, have the force of law, it may
nonetheless be useful in helping local government officials develop the capacity to
evaluate manufacturing facilities. To the extent that CSC9000T embodies the existing
requirements of Chinese law, it would be appropriate for local governments to develop
this capability. In fact, local government officials might well view the development of
CSC9000T by the quasi-official National Textile and Apparel Council as encouragement
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from China's central government for them to be more proactive in enforcing existing law.
To the extent that such evaluations generate income (from inspection fees, for example,
or perhaps from fines for violations of legal codes), local governments may have a
financial incentive to become more proactive in enforcing labor law as written.

IV. Theoretical and policy implications.
This article bridges two previously distinct fields of law, one that has to do with
the institutions and mechanisms by which private contracts are drafted and enforced, and
the other which has to do with how corporate behavior is policed, especially in the
international arena.
A. The contractual role of third party assurance. On the contract side, the role
being played by third-party assurance in global commerce can be understood as a
mechanism for solving a number of common contracting problems. 118
First, we can think of the relationship between a manufacturing firm in a
developing country and a global corporation that contracts to buy the output of the
manufacturer as an “agency” relationship, in which the manufacturer is making
specialized goods on behalf of the global corporation. In any agency relationship we
would expect to find problems arising from “asymmetric information” (The agent has
knowledge about his performance that the principal does not have.) and from
misalignment of incentives (The agent doesn’t always have an incentive to perform in a
way that is in the principal’s best interest.).
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Employing third-party assurance services can help address both problems by
monitoring the agent’s activities on behalf of the principal. On one hand, using a thirdparty assurance service might increase agency costs by engaging yet another agent – with
all the associated information asymmetry and incentive problems. On the other, the
third-party assurance organization may in many instances have several monitoring
advantages relative to the cost of the principal either doing its own monitoring or simply
living with the discrepancy between what the global corporation wants and what the
manufacturing firm actually does. Relying on the assurance firm may also save costs for
the principal because they specialize in monitoring certain kinds of problems, and thereby
bring certain expertise to bear in gathering and interpreting the necessary information.
Second, contracts between global corporation and a developing country supplier
may inevitably be incomplete in some ways.119 In parts of the world where legal systems
are well-developed, contracting parties can have access to courts if they get into a dispute
about some aspect of the relationship, and courts can generally be relied upon to decide
the dispute by imputing terms that may be missing in the formal contract. If courts are
regarded by both parties to the contract as neutral, independent and reasonably
sophisticated, the parties are likely to be comfortable with this approach to dispute
resolution. But where contracting parties do not have a high level of confidence in courts
of law, we might expect to find alternative arrangements that involve appeals to neutral,
but sophisticated third parties such as arbitrators and assurance firms. Recognizing this
issue, China, for example, established a quasi-governmental organization, CIETAC,
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whose roots go back to the 1950s for the purpose of arbitrating disputes between Chinese
firms and foreign companies doing business with China. Third-party assurance
organizations of the type we are considering in this article do not handle complex
contract disputes, but they may be able to resolve relatively simple questions about
contractual performance, such as whether the manufacturing contractor maintains a
“safe” workplace and does not employ child labor.
Third, it is a well-understood phenomenon in contract theory that performance
problems in contractual relationships can be substantially reduced if both parties to the
contract have reputational capital at risk in the relationship.120 Parties that have a
reputation for honesty, competence, and fair-dealing can reduce their costs of contracting
because their contractual partners know that the advantages of cheating in a particular
relationship are likely to be more than offset by the costs to the firm from reputational
damage. In the relationship between a large, globally-recognized corporation and a local
manufacturing firm in a developing country, the global company is likely to have more
reputational capital at stake to constrain its behavior and bond its commitments, at least
initially. The supplier firm may have strong incentives to develop a reputation as an
honest and reliable trading partner over time, but may initially need to expend resources
to build that reputation. Employing third-party assurance services may serve that
function by acting as a “reputational interemediary.” This may work because the
assurance firm has little in the way of assets except its reputation, and it has no direct
stake in the outcome of any evaluation it performs. It may therefore may be more
credible in how it evaluates the supplier-firm’s performance.
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In recent years, economists and legal scholars interested in economic
development have begun focusing on another type of contractual problem, which is the
problem that arises when the legal system is weak, corrupt or unsophisticated, so that the
contracting parties cannot count on courts and officers of the law for fair and independent
adjudication and enforcement of contracts. Such circumstances are common in many
developing countries, and a growing literature argues that the resulting lack of reliable
property or contract enforcement may be a major factor impeding economic
development.121 In such situations, the parties may be able to anticipate and specify in
fairly fine detail who is to do what under what circumstances, but that may be of small
comfort if there is no authority available who can enforce the terms.
One might expect that the same institutional arrangements that make a contract
“self-enforcing” might also be used extensively to govern business relationships when
enforcement authorities are weak, corrupt, or unsophisticated. An alternative, however,
might be for the contracting parties to develop systems of private contract enforcement,
such as agreements to rely on the assessments of third party inspectors and verifiers for a
determination of whether contract terms were satisfied. It appears to us that this is what
is happening now in many contexts around the world. In the interaction between global
corporations and local firms in developing countries, the parties may, in effect be
importing resources for private law enforcement to interpret contract terms and determine
whether they have been met.
Third-part assurance firms may thus supply certain contract facilitating and
enforcing functions in developing countries that might be supplied by formal legal
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institutions in developed countries. In performing these functions, the assurance service
can perhaps be understood to be importing “rule of law” procedural norms into countries
where legal institutions are weak.
B. The regulatory role of third-party assurance. On the question of how the
behavior of global corporations is to be regulated and policed, the phenomenon of thirdparty assurance can be examined in light of so-called “new governance” theories,122 or
“global administrative law” theories,123 which have been exploring the role of private
actors in public “law-making.” These theories recognize that today we observe an
accelerating diffusion of regulatory power among networks of state and non-state actors
that transcend national boundaries124 A central premise of these theories is that in the
global economy, “regulatory governance function[s] in a manner not dependent on state
law or in which state law is not central,” that there is “ a loosening of the sharp
distinction between states and markets and between the public and the private.”125 Thus,
transnational regulation is now understood to encompass:
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“regulation by non-regulation (laissez-faire), through formal self-regulation (such
as by some industry associations), hybrid private-private regulation (for example,
business-NGO partnerships in the Fair Labor Association), hybrid public-private
regulation (for instance, in mutual recognition arrangements where a private
agency in one country tests products to certify compliance with governmental
standards of another country), network governance by state officials (as in the
work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
on environmental policies to be followed by national export credit agencies),
inter-governmental organizations with direct governance powers (as with
determinations by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees of
individuals’ refugee status, or the WTO dispute resolution system for trade
conflicts).126
The phenomenon we study in this paper points to an emerging alternative
mechanism of regulation that is tied to private contractual relationships. As we noted
above, global, branded companies are exposed to ever greater risks as their supply chains
lengthen, as production is moved outside of the firm, and as companies increasingly
come under pressure to demonstrate that the conditions of production in their supply
chains meet international standards. Given these pressures, companies are including
“regulatory” standards for health, safety, conditions of employment and environmental
management in their supply-chain contracts,127 and then engaging various certifying
organizations to provide assurance that the standards have been met.
Thus, the role being played by third-party assurance may be a merging of private
law contractual mechanisms for organizing production with public law activities of
standard setting and enforcement.
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V. Conclusions.
We have suggested in this paper that a new private sector mechanism is emerging
and operating globally that may provide a substitute for law and formal legal structures
both in contract enforcement and in policing the social behavior of firms. The third-party
assurance industry, which came to sudden prominence in international commerce in
recent years initially to provide expert evaluations of product qualities for purposes of
enforcing private contracts, is now being deployed globally to implement and enforce
social standards. In the process, the activities of these organizations may be having the
effect of promulgating international business norms and standards of human rights, labor
protection, and social responsibility.
Even where local law as written is consistent with such international standards
(such as seems to be true at least for labor protection in China), third party assurance
provides an enforcement mechanism would otherwise be lacking in many countries.
Moreover, as we have seen in the Chinese case study, importing international standards
and private sector enforcers may have the effect of hastening the development of formal
legal institutions that have the potential to implement and enforce for those standards.
This is clearly not the only possible interpretation of these developments.
Commercial interests have long established parallel institutions for the arbitration of
commercial disputes that do not depend on local judicial systems, and do not necessarily
have any positive effect on those judicial systems.128 Some commentators have even
suggested that arbitration of commercial disputes can undermine public law
developments by allowing firms to contract around public law, even the laws of
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developed economies such as the EU or US.129 So we recognize the need for us to do
further theoretical work to determine what aspects of “rule of law” are more amenable to
influence by the developments described in this paper, and then test those theories by
evaluating in detail the effect that strengthening commercial substitutes for local judicial
enforcement has on public judicial and legal establishments.
We want to know more, for example, about the political dynamic that has given
rise to, and that is now responding to third party assurance regimes as enforcers of social
standards. It seems likely, for example, that the new Chinese social responsibility
standard, CSC9000T, will not replace third party assurance unless foreign buyers treat a
CSC9000T evaluation as the substantial equivalent of an audit and certification, to a
Western standard or code of conduct, by an independent third party. For the reasons
identified above, however, foreign buyers will undoubtedly be cautious about embracing
CSC9000T—in significant part because it neither provides public acknowledgement nor
credible assurance that suppliers have actually met acceptable social standards for
production.
This suggests an interesting Catch-22 for NGOs, activists, business people and
financial institutions who want to see social and political reform in developing countries.
The importation of Western standards and third-party certification may, in the short run,
help to impose norms and rule of law values such as transparency and accountability in
developing economies, including in China. These standards may require more stringent
human rights or labor protections than those offered by the law as enforced, as in China,
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but may be consistent with the protections some Chinese political reformers and
intellectuals advocate. In some enterprises, such as toys, apparel and sports equipment
manufacturers, for example, it appears to us that the existence of external pressures from
foreign buyers has allowed some Chinese citizens greater degree of freedom so that they
have been able to advocate for reforms such as expanded labor rights and better human
rights protection.130 To the extent that participants in and around Chinese enterprise
participate in developing business norms and social assurance standards and procedures
modeled on Western variants, then, they are essentially engaging in type of political
action in a context that is likely to be less threatening to the government than other types
of political activity. Such a development may ultimately be a powerful lever for political
liberalization in China.

Of course it may also be that China’s experience is atypical. While it is certainly
the case that the assurance service business has grown dramatically in size and in
importance in China in the last decade, it has also become extremely important around
the world, from Mexico to India to Thailand and Vietnam, to Turkey and Eastern Europe
and South Africa. And, just as in China, the industry seems to be playing both a contract
enforcement role, and a role in introducing and enforcing social norms and standards
wherever it is operating. We are unaware, however, of local governments outside of
China that are attempting to create their own regulatory and inspection regimes in
response to the activities of the private sector assurance organizations. These are all
questions that await further research.
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